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Abstract
In this note, I clarify the point of my paper “The Nature of Semantics: On Jack-
endoff’s Arguments” (NS) in light of Ray Jackendoff’s comments in his “Lin-
guistics in Cognitive Science: The State of the Art.” Along the way, I amplify
my remarks on unification.1
NS criticized two arguments Jackendoff offers against referential semantics.
The first argument was that reference relations would be examples of inten-
tionality, but one cannot make naturalistic sense of intentionality. The second
argument was that there is something “suspect” either about the alleged ob-
jects to which a reference relation would relate representations or in the very
notion of object such a semantics assumes. I criticized both of these arguments
as failing to establish their conclusions and, in particular, as resting on dubi-
ous philosophical assumptions. (Jackendoff does not take up these criticisms
in his reply, so I will not elaborate further upon them here.) The point of NS
was not to establish the nature of semantics or, more specifically, to defend
referential semantics. It was to clear away some unconvincing philosophical
arguments that might stand in the way of assessing referential semantics on
empirical grounds.
Jackendoff’s reply suggests that the point of NS was not apparent to him,
in part as a result of his misunderstanding how I see the relations among ref-
erential semantics, conceptualist semantics, physicalism, and methodological
naturalism. Before I turn to his remarks, it will be useful to review these labels.
1. Austin (1979: 154) once remarked that replies to replies face “the law of diminishing fleas.” I
am aware of the indulgence I ask of the reader. All references to Jackendoff are to Jackendoff
(2007) unless otherwise noted. My thanks to Georges Rey for helpful comments on a draft,
to Nancy Ritter for organizing these exchanges, and especially to Ray Jackendoff for the
instruction and stimulation his work has provided and continues to provide.
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Referential semantics:
The attempt to characterize (typically compositionally) the intentional
properties of some system of representations – i.e., to characterize
what they “represent” or are “about,” what purported things they refer
to or are true of. Linguo-semantics concerns the intentional proper-
ties of linguistic representations (morphemes, phrases, etc.); psycho-
semantics concerns the intentional properties of mental representa-
tions (percepts, concepts, etc.).2
Conceptualist semantics:
The investigation of conceptual structures in the mind/brain and their
interfaces with other mental structures such as those implicated in lin-
guistic competence. It is not assumed that these structures have any
intentional properties at all: in any event, conceptualist semantics does
not concern itself with intentional properties if there are any.
Physicalism (a kind of metaphysical naturalism):
The doctrine that everything is composed of physical things (things
posited by physics) and every property is appropriately related to phys-
ical properties (properties posited by physics). Physicalists disagree
about what constitutes a suitable relation to physical properties. Some
require reducibility, others only require supervenience – i.e., that there
be no change in non-physical properties without some change in phys-
ical properties.
Methodological naturalism:
The injunction to aim for well-supported, intelligible explanations as
measured against our evolving standards of successful science.
Now, in his reply, Jackendoff writes that I “oppose [Jackendoff’s] conceptual-
ist semantics with a position [Gross] calls ‘methodological naturalism.’ ” This
might be read in one of two ways, but on both readings it is incorrect. First,
Jackendoff might mean that I oppose conceptualist semantics, and the way I
oppose it is by adverting to methodological naturalism. This is incorrect be-
cause NS does not oppose conceptualist semantics. It opposes Jackendoff’s
objections to referential semantics. Of course, to oppose certain objections to
referential semantics is not to endorse referential semantics. Indeed, far from
defending referential semantics, NS mentions an alternative ground for crit-
icizing it at least in the linguistic case – viz., the difficulty of disentangling
2. In NS, I labeled referential semantics ‘Intentional Worldy Semantics (IWS)’ in order to high-
light the two main aspects that Jackendoff attacks. I also (2005b: 257, Fn. 17) distinguished
descriptive and foundational projects in semantics. The former characterize intentional prop-
erties (as with referential semantics); the latter ask in virtue of what representations have the
intentional properties they do. This distinction is relevant to Fn. 7 below.
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semantics and pragmatics. (Cf. Gross 2005a cited at Gross 2005b: 264, Fn.
31; cf. also Gross 1998/2001.) But even if one were to endorse referential se-
mantics, one would not thereby oppose conceptualist semantics – at least not
obviously. For, as highlighted in the introduction to NS, and pace Jackendoff,
it is not obvious that conceptualist semantics and referential semantics cannot
be seen as two aspects of a larger project and thus themselves subject, if you
will, to unification.
Second, Jackendoff might mean that I take methodological naturalism to be
the opposite of conceptualist semantics and vice versa. This is also incorrect.
NS contrasts methodological naturalism, not with conceptualist semantics, but
with physicalism, a kind of metaphysical naturalism (and an apparent philo-
sophical premise in Jackendoff’s first argument against referential semantics).
The two naturalisms, however, are not opposed. One could endorse both, nei-
ther, or either. Likewise, following Jackendoff, NS contrasts conceptualist se-
mantics and referential semantics. But, as just discussed, it does not assume
that they are opposed: there is the possibility that they might be combined. Fi-
nally, NS certainly does not argue that methodological naturalism and concep-
tualist semantics are opposed – i.e., that conceptualist semantics, given current
knowledge and by current standards, fares poorly as an explanatory theory. NS
in fact makes a point of noting that it nowhere challenges Jackendoff’s im-
portant contributions to lexical and phrasal semantics. Besides this brief note,
NS does not so much as take up the question of conceptualist semantics’ ex-
planatory success. Neither does it discuss how referential semantics fares in
the regard – beyond alluding to the problem of disentangling semantics and
pragmatics. NS’s goal was to shift focus away from the philosophical consid-
erations Jackendoff raises and to empirical considerations – but it ends at that
point.3
Jackendoff expresses surprise that I both note that a methodological natu-
ralist can accept intentionality4 and quote a passage of his that advocates the
position that, “even if there is intentionality, we still have to explain how the
mind grasps meaning.” As far as I can tell, Jackendoff’s surprise is based on
the misunderstanding that I take conceptualist semantics and methodological
naturalism to be opposed. But I do not. So, Jackendoff need not be perplexed
by my agreeing – indeed, explicitly emphasizing – that accepting intentionality
does not threaten his conceptualist semantics. Jackendoff argues against refer-
ential semantics in part by denying intentionality tout court. NS argues that
3. One of the ways NS tries to achieve this shift is to contrast metaphysical naturalism and
methodological naturalism. The former is a philosophical premise Jackendoff seems to rely
on in arguing against intentionality – one open to question. The latter focuses attention on
successful explanation, but raises no challenge to the existence of intentionality.
4. Though she must reject non-explanatory theories of intentionality, or that advert to intention-
ality, as she must reject any non-explanatory theory.
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this argument fails: the discussion of methodological naturalism that Jackend-
off cites occurs in the course of NS’s making this point. But to argue against
an argument against referential semantics is not to argue against conceptualist
semantics – especially if it remains possible, for all that has been shown, that
the two are not incompatible.
Similarly, I do not see that the success of Jackendoff’s contributions to lex-
ical and phrasal semantics “demonstrate[s] how an insistence on intentionality
. . . actually gets in the way of insightful semantic/conceptual analysis.” This
might follow if acknowledging the existence of intentionality precluded con-
ceptualist semantics. But it is not obvious that it does. Again, as NS notes, none
of its remarks call into question Jackendoff’s contributions – nor has Jackend-
off here added any considerations that now give me reason to think that there is
some tension between acknowledging intentionality and engaging in concep-
tualist semantics. Further, Jackendoff has not shown that deploying intentional
notions in referential semantics threatens the ability of conceptualist seman-
tics to yield insightful semantic/conceptual analysis. Finally, I do not see what
compelling grounds Jackendoff has supplied – not that there might not be some
– for thinking referential semantics in its own right fails to supply insightful se-
mantic/conceptual analysis. In particular, the success of Jackendoff’s empirical
work does not by itself show that referential semantics is non-explanatory –
unless, again, one can show (what Jackendoff seems to assume and NS ques-
tions) that conceptualist semantics and referential semantics are relevantly op-
posed. Thus, I do not yet know what Jackendoff’s basis is for seeing “Gross’s
position [perhaps he rather means the position of the referential semanticist?]
as actually warding off unification of semantics with the rest of cognitive sci-
ence.”
That said, I do think it is very much an open question whether we can expect
in practice, or even in principle, to achieve an understanding of intentional-
ity that can be unified with the rest of our understanding of the mind/brain.
In-practice worries arise from the complexity of the mind/brain basis of the
phenomenon of intentionality – the possibility that intentionality might reflect
a complex and in-practice theoretically intractable interaction effect among
many components of the mind/brain, not to mention complex facts concerning
their interaction with the natural and social environment. In-principle worries
arise, for example, from the possibility that the intentional facts are intrinsi-
cally normative and thus not the kind of fact that can be explained naturalisti-
cally. Such obstacles would indeed have consequences for the aim of unifying
semantics with the rest of cognitive science. But the consequence would not
simply be that conceptualist semantics, which eschews intentionality, holds out
more promise for unification. Rather, conceptualist semantics would hold out
more promise for unification with the rest of the cognitive sciences that also
eschew intentionality. Referential semantics might hold out more promise for
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unification with other parts of cognitive science that (at least seem to) advert
to intentionality. The larger question would remain of whether the intentional
parts of cognitive science could be unified with the rest. And, of course, as
already mentioned, there would be the even larger, prior question of whether
intentionality can have any place in a successful explanatory theory at all.
These issues are too large to enter further into here. What I want to note,
however, is that Jackendoff attempts in effect to render the unification problem
easier by dismissing much of what we might want our unified account ulti-
mately to explain. If there is no intentionality, as Jackendoff claims, then of
course it is no obstacle to unification. But the denial of intentionality is a radi-
cal claim, one for which (NS argues) Jackendoff supplies insufficient grounds.
If there is intentionality, then conceptualist semantics, which eschews the in-
tentional, leaves it untouched – however well conceptualist semantics may or
may not lend itself to unification with the rest of the cognitive sciences. Uni-
fication is of course all to the good: as NS remarks, it yields an increase in
explanatory scope. But recalcitrance to unification might reflect any of a vari-
ety of things. Sure, it might suggest that we are on the wrong track – perhaps so
far off as to be investigating what is not really there. But it might rather reflect
our current ignorance, our cognitive limitations as scientists, or even a feature
of the subject matter. So let us always aspire to unification where possible.
But where there is a phenomenon that presently seems to thwart our unifica-
tory aspirations (and perhaps even threatens to forever remain beyond the grasp
of explanatory theorizing), let’s recognize that – even as we consider ways of
pushing ahead.
NS began with Jackendoff’s remark that meaning is the “‘holy grail’ not
only of linguistics, but also of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience – not
to mention more distant domains such as cultural and literary theory.” It noted
further that Jackendoff seems then to reject the very holy grail he seeks. But
he would claim only to reject a mistaken conception of that grail in favor of
non-intentional structures that play roles analogous to those supposedly played
by the mythological meanings we should reject. As is clear, I do not see that
Jackendoff has given us any reason to reject either linguistic meaning as usually
conceived (which is not to endorse that conception either!) or intentionality
more generally. But let me use Chomsky as a foil once again in my attempt to
display alternative positions that Jackendoff fails to consider.
Chomsky (2000: 45) claims that “[n]aturalistic inquiry will always fall short
of intentionality.” Thus:
If “cognitive science” is taken to be concerned with intentional attribution, it
may turn out to be an interesting pursuit (as literature is), but it is not likely to
provide explanatory theory or to be integrated into the natural sciences. (2000:
23)
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But he does not conclude that there is no such thing as intentionality or that we
cannot advance our understanding of it:
Plainly, a naturalistic approach does not exclude other ways of trying to com-
prehend the world. Someone committed to it can consistently believe (I do) that
we learn much more of human interest about how people think and feel and act
by reading novels or studying history than from all of naturalistic psychology,
and perhaps always will . . . (2000: 77)
Thus, whereas Jackendoff suggests that the conceptualist ersatz might suffice
for the needs even of literary theory, an alternative position is that the study
of literature (of course not only that) might concern itself with, and advance
our understanding of, matters that so far and perhaps forever may elude our
science-forming capacities and, in particular, go beyond what conceptualist
semantics explains.5
I have concentrated on the second of Jackendoff’s two paragraphs in reply
to NS. Let me close with a remark on his first. Jackendoff rightly notes that of
course it does not follow from the fact that the presence of a cow can activate
a cow-concept that the mere presence of a cow is alone sufficient for the cow-
concept to be activated. But he complains that I take the “relation of the cow
to the cow-concept for granted, as though it’s simply self-evident,” suggesting
either that (1) I do not think this relation involves the complex goings-on of
the perceptual system and other aspects of the mind-brain, or perhaps (2) that I
think the nature of this relation, including what’s going on in the mind-brain, is
itself self-evident. I clearly rejected (1). Worrying that Jackendoff at one point
confuses Fodor with a strawman, I wrote:
Jackendoff [2002: 279] also parenthetically criticizes Fodor for not saying how
something can cause a representation of it to be tokened: “by acting on the
speaker’s perceptual system? Fodor doesn’t say.” . . . This seems unfair since
the answer is obviously ‘yes’. (2005b: 256, Fn. 15)
I took it as self-evident that perception can play such a role.6 But it is certainly
the case that NS did not then proceed to say much about it. That was because
5. I say only may elude. Unlike Chomsky, I am not so confident as to place bets. Yet it might
be – indeed I have some sympathy for the suggestion – that cognitive science is more likely
to progress (and achieve partial unifications) where it eschews intentionality, both as object
of study and as tool in explanation. Still, this would provide no more reason to deny inten-
tionality than one’s better headway on calmer waters provides reason to deny the existence of
stormy seas. (Scientists are warned not to be like the person who drops his keys by the curb
but then looks for them under the streetlamp down the block where there is better light. In the
scientist’s case, however, no one should deny that there may also be lots of other interesting
stuff under the streetlamp.)
6. Cf. Fodor (1990: 210). I do not mean to suggest that there are not real deficiencies in Fodor’s
views.
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it was not its topic – not because I take what perception involves to be self-
evident, as (2) would suggest. I agree that “the relation of my cow-concepts to
cows has to be mediated by the perceptual system, for which the explanatory
burden falls on psychology and neuroscience.” Shouldering that explanatory
burden requires the extremely hard empirical work of cadres of scientists, in-
cluding the hard work that has gone into Jackendoff’s own important contribu-
tions. If only the nature of the mind-brain and its relations to things outside of
it were self-evident to us! If I did not make that sufficiently clear, that’s because
I take that to be obvious as well.7
Johns Hopkins University
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7. Jackendoff notes that in a footnote I say as much, but he seems hesitant to take me at my word.
One guess is that this stems from the fact that he characterizes his imagined opponent as re-
quiring a “direct” relation between representations and what they represent. But ‘direct’ is not
my word, and, in the note that he quotes, I explicitly disown its seeming implications. There
is a position in semantics known as ‘direct reference,’ according to which certain expressions
– e.g., proper names – refer directly as opposed to mediately through a description or concept.
Maybe this is behind Jackendoff’s usage? But direct reference is a particular thesis held only
by some referential semanticists about some expressions. Moreover, even these “direct refer-
ence theorists” typically hold that the relation between a representation and what it represents
in virtue of which the representation (perhaps in part) has the content it does is complex, not
direct. Thus, some combine their direct-reference answer to certain questions in “descriptive”
semantics with a causal-chain answer, for example, to questions in “foundational” semantics.
Note further that both sorts of questions must be distinguished from questions concerning
what leads to a particular representation being tokened on any particular occasion. Thus, re-
turning to mental representations, we must distinguish what my mental representation DOG
refers to, in virtue of what DOG refers to what it does, and what caused it to be tokened or
activated on some particular occasion.
